Geoffrey Wawro (born 1960) is an American Professor of Military History at the University of North Texas, and Director of the UNT Military History Center. His primary area of emphasis is modern and contemporary military history, from the French Revolution to the present.
The Vietnam War: a Military History is far from a boring recitation of military engagements but rather an absorbing and profound—occasionally sphincter-clinching—exploration of the political decisions & assumptions on both sides that drove one of the 20th century’s most contentious conflicts.
This book stands out for its detailed dissection of the political missteps and strategic miscalculations that characterized the involvement of the United States, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam.
His narrative, derived from meticulous research into original material, delves into the North Vietnamese leaders’ strategic patience and adaptability, which starkly contrasted with the South Vietnamese government’s profound corruption and instability and our own policymakers’ delusional fantasies of both the North and the South’s capabilities.
Wawro’s analysis extends far beyond the battlefield maneuvering and recitation of body count to include inside baseball on the political machinations (both north and south), partisan infighting, White House bed-wetting, and a plethora of strong (but it turns out loosely held) opinions expressed by Congress in Washington and the Politburo in Hanoi. In short, war as performance patriotism.
Frankly, Wawro’s detailed political analysis makes this particular history an absorbing read. Through his meticulous research of primary materials from archives around the world, some only recently discovered or released from archives, Wawro offers a unique perspective on motivations and the profound misjudgments that prolonged the war on both sides.
Wawro also provides shocking insights into the malfeasance of American military leadership, revealing how Generals Westmoreland and Abrams misled the President about the war’s progress, prioritizing their reputations over honest reporting, while doggedly pursing the same failed strategy year after year at the cost of several hundred American lives per day.
"Cooking the books" does not even begin to describe the levels of deceit exhibited by Army leadership.
A Lagniappe
Warro’s Book is Chocked Full of Statistical Gems. For Instance, I was not aware that:
- of the 525,000 American troops in Vietnam at one time, only 50-60,000 were ever engaged in combat arms.
- American infantry in Vietnam endured an average of 240 days of combat every year, compared with just 40 for the GIs of World War II.
- Fast dust-offs meant that only 1.5 percent of American wounded were dying in Vietnam in 1966, compared with 2.5 percent in Korea and 4.5 percent in World War II.
- There is also a detailed account of the treasonous Chenault Affair, devised by President Nixon and Secretary Kissenger to ensure Nixon’s presidential election by sabotaging Johnson’s Paris peace talks. This venal, criminal act alone cost America an extra 10,000 killed in action, billions of wasted dollars, and extended the war by years.
The Fall
"Soldiers removed their uniforms and put on civilian clothes. Office workers pulled on the black pajamas that were the Indochinese communist uniform."
By the time of the fall of Saigon, no one believed. If they ever did.
The Vietnam War is essential reading for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the war’s political dimensions. It serves as a poignant reminder of the profound human costs of war and is a significant contribution to the literature on military and political history.