# WarGames for real: How one 1983 exercise nearly triggered WWIII  ## Metadata - Author:: [[Sean Gallagher]] - Full Title:: WarGames for real: How one 1983 exercise nearly triggered WWIII - Category: #articles - URL: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/11/wargames-for-real-how-one-1983-exercise-nearly-triggered-wwiii/ ## Highlights > Named for an acronym for "Nuclear Missile Attack" (Ракетное Ядерное Нападение), RYAN was an intelligence operation started in 1981 to help the intelligence agency forecast if the US and its allies were planning a nuclear strike. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgbm4dday2qkzb6j04z19w)) > Exercise Able Archer '83 triggered that forecast. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgbvzq21k32gaxba87be4h)) > Top Secret with the code word UMBRA, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgj5x92hvcsdgq4rx5geps)) > Top Secret with the code word UMBRA, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgj94wd0t0qgvvr3r2f3an)) ##### "Let's play Global Thermonuclear War." > The software in question was a KGB computer model constructed as part of Operation RYAN (РЯН), details of which were obtained from Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB's London section chief who was at the same time spying for Britain's MI6. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z813q6r7gx5frkamkh2n5p)) > As it turned out, Exercise Able Archer '83 triggered that forecast. The war game, which was staged over two weeks in November of 1983, simulated the procedures that NATO would go through prior to a nuclear launch ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z81d5t4a5vyy3b3gjmewzq)) > This data was everything the leadership expected given the intransigence of the Reagan administration. The US' aggressive foreign policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s confused and worried the USSR. They didn't understand the reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan, which they thought the US would just recognize as a vital security operation. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgcy7ke7sj7yn9rpzpckzb)) > Many of these procedures and tactics were things the Soviets had never seen, and the whole exercise came after a series of feints by US and NATO forces to size up Soviet defenses and the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 on September 1, 1983. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z81vs5499zj976ht06ydn9)) > The US was even funding the mujaheddin fighting them, "training and sending armed terrorists," as Communist Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov put it in a 1980 speech (those trainees including a young Saudi inspired to jihad by the name of Osama bin Laden). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgd6qb81m5647e4fxd2893)) > Top Secret with the code word UMBRA ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z82a2vwe0w36zmmsvtb6ba)) > When combined with [previously released](http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/) CIA, [National Security Agency (NSA),](http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/images/fischersidebyside.png) and Defense Department documents, this PFIAB report shows that only the illness of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov—and the instincts of one mid-level Soviet officer—may have prevented a nuclear launch. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z82mn0mzem98jddc9p769a)) ##### The balance of paranoia > As Able Archer '83 was getting underway, the US defense and intelligence community believed the Soviet Union was strategically secure. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8348k3g5kgrvxfamdqa27)) > The US had mapped out the "[Yankee Patrol Boxes](http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/06/world/3-soviet-submarines-said-to-patrol-atlantic-box.html)" where Soviet Navaga-class (NATO designation "Yankee") ballistic missile subs stationed themselves off the US' east and west coasts. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgdp6m206dqxav1jzjd073)) > In 1981, the KGB foreign intelligence directorate ran a computer analysis using an early version of the RYAN system, seeking the "correlation of world forces" between the USSR and the United States. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z84qpm3qz7bkhf3kzjnht9)) > Soviet long-range bombers were "kept at a low state of readiness," the advisory board report noted. Hours or days would have been required to get bombers ready for an all-out war. In all likelihood, the Soviet leadership assumed their entire bomber force would be caught on the ground in a sneak attack and wiped out. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tge7zmtabc0kcqehpsj0th)) > The US was even funding the mujaheddin fighting them, "training and sending armed terrorists," as Communist Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov put it in a 1980 speech (those trainees including a young Saudi inspired to jihad by the name of Osama bin Laden). And in Nicaragua, the US was funneling arms to the Contras fighting the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega. All the while, Reagan was refusing to engage the Soviets on arms control. This mounting evidence convinced some in the Soviet leadership that Reagan was willing to go even further in his efforts to destroy what he would soon describe as the "evil empire." ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z84yqj5ewfr2z6fm9wrgpv)) > Even theater nuclear forces like the RSD-10 Pioneer—one of the weapons systems that prompted the deployment of the Pershing II to Europe—were vulnerable. They generally didn't have warheads or missiles loaded into their mobile launcher systems when not on alert. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgejexh0v6rqsbbgv18280)) > The seaborne leg of the Soviet strategic force was especially vulnerable ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z85krvkcp5xtn1g945gwk8)) > The US had mapped out the "[Yankee Patrol Boxes](http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/06/world/3-soviet-submarines-said-to-patrol-atlantic-box.html)" where Soviet Navaga-class (NATO designation "Yankee") ballistic missile subs stationed themselves off the US' east and west coasts. Again, the Soviets knew all of this thanks to the spy John Walker, so confidence in their sub fleet's survivability was likely low. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z85rc5p1keahwgcy40jd71)) > While SDI was presented as defensive, it would likely only be effective if the US dramatically reduced the number of Soviet ICBMs launched by making a first strike. More than ever before, SDI convinced the Soviet leadership that Reagan was aiming to make a nuclear war against them winnable. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgft5gczzgndhembxv3p59)) > Combined with his ongoing anti-Soviet rhetoric, USSR leadership saw Reagan as an existential threat against the country on par with Hitler. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgg297gq0jz3m1fayc9sad)) > In all likelihood, the Soviet leadership assumed their entire bomber force would be caught on the ground in a sneak attack and wiped out. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z86bw6q48v5d7sgjvwnmeh)) > They generally didn't have warheads or missiles loaded into their mobile launcher systems when not on alert. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z86wxs99fy3zhsxfmrats8)) > After Reagan took office in 1981, the Soviet leadership pushed on the USSR's intelligence apparatus to make sure they were ready to act if Reagan did the insane and was preparing a surprise attack. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgjw2qjpgdftbhj5qpdw78)) > Even if it was technologically advanced, the thinking behind RYAN was purely old-school, based on the lessons learned by the Soviets from World War II. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgkz0vw14b71a8h8ayqqdb)) > Combined with his ongoing anti-Soviet rhetoric, USSR leadership saw Reagan as an existential threat against the country on par with Hitler. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8843vtxwfrhz9kf0kf9v7)) > 40,000 weighted data points based on military, political, and economic factors that Soviet experts believed were decisive in determining the course of the war with Nazi Germany. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgm9gcrqvyyyb72tbw4jdm)) > RYAN's model was constantly updated with new data from the field, and the RYAN score report was sent once a month to the Politburo. Anything above a 70 was acceptable, but the experts who built the system believed that a score of 60 or above meant the Soviet Union was safe from surprise attack. Anything lower was bad news. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgnneqj1vpnfhb18d6fpwz)) > The data points being demanded included: > • Details of military operations plans from the US and NATO allies, Japan, and China (which was at the time considered to be allying with the US against the USSR) that indicated preparations for war against the Warsaw Pact; > • Plans for how forces would be deployed for war; > • Any signs of military mobilization; > • Operational doctrine for nuclear attacks; > • Political activities surrounding the decision process for launching a nuclear war or other conflict, including consultations between NATO countries over the use of military force, which the KGB considered "one of the states of immediate preparation by the adversary for [surprise nuclear attack];" > • Where Air Force One was plus logistical data on its operations and airfields it landed at; > • Details on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's nuclear war plans, and details of who was in the order of succession for leadership of the US in event of a nuclear war; > • The activity of the National Security Council and Vice President Bush's crisis staff; > • And Wall Street and banking activity, the trade in currency and gold, "as well as the movement of high-grade jewelry, collections of rare paintings, and similar items" that might indicate patterns of behavior connected to plans for war. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgppw5b7gtx2f58txjawr3)) ##### Shall we play a game? > After Reagan took office in 1981, the Soviet leadership pushed on the USSR's intelligence apparatus to make sure they were ready to act if Reagan did the insane and was preparing a surprise attack. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z89bghmr879g6dwdsptt78)) > As soon as RYAN was updated with the new information, it immediately started churning out bad news. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgqdnw36d74awby7wx5ndx)) > Even if it was technologically advanced, the thinking behind RYAN was purely old-school, based on the lessons learned by the Soviets from World War II. It used a collection of approximately 40,000 weighted data points based on military, political, and economic factors that Soviet experts believed were decisive in determining the course of the war with Nazi Germany. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8ahjn5vjhyrkje9xnwkwy)) > The Soviet Navy started experimenting with launching missiles from pierside in the event of an attack. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgr0dandv4cat7bwj217dw)) > It didn't help much that President Reagan had essentially given the US Navy and Air Force carte blanche ability to screw with the Soviets' heads ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgrq5vd9kg2sdx4awph7vj)) > The system used the US' power as a fixed scale, measuring the Soviet position as a percentage score based on all the data points. RYAN's model was constantly updated with new data from the field, and the RYAN score report was sent once a month to the Politburo. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8b0pvfeggydaf1gaxr2jy)) > . The Navy staged multiple operations and exercises in places where the fleet had never gone before, all in close proximity to major Soviet military and industrial sites. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgs0ccer0kp4nrgnhfy1c6)) > When Soviet maritime patrol planes finally found them, the carrier's fighter wing staged simulated attacks on the "Bear" patrol planes as they were performing in-flight refueling. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgt0he68cv5w1x16ze68yz)) > In the Soviet military, no one was sure who had nuclear release authority until Andropov was named as Brezhnev's successor on November 15. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgv4mastj16xh185y4zydg)) > Andropov had a fever for more RYAN, and the KGB responded by creating an entire new workforce in its stations at Soviet embassies in the West dedicated to feeding it. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgvg77bk4mw1bykkyvmx3n)) ##### Greetings, Professor Falken > However the KGB decided to use these data points, it did not make things better. As soon as RYAN was updated with the new information, it immediately started churning out bad news. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8dasdmsgzyg32xe9hmcq9)) > Pretty much everything the Reagan administration and the US military did in 1983—along with some of the things the Soviets thought that they had done—pushed the buttons on RYAN. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgw3q05k36v7897ypxrbjw)) > In a Congressional hearing following the exercise, Admiral James Watkins testified that the Soviets were "as naked as jaybird there and they know it." ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgxcg8nwrc37sa05nmk5a0)) > The US posturing led Andropov to warn US envoy Averell Harriman in a June meeting (the "first real meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union since the start of the Administration," a State Department memo noted) [no less than four times](http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/docs/12.%20Notes%20of%20Conversation%20with%20Secretary%20Shultz,%20Undersecretary%20%20Eagleburger,%20and%20Averell%20Harriman-ca%20May%201983.pdf) of the risk of triggering a nuclear war through miscalculation. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgxtg39j616383jq4f37k7)) > . The Navy staged multiple operations and exercises in places where the fleet had never gone before, all in close proximity to major Soviet military and industrial sites. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8e6pqzpy26hwn88b5b2qy)) > In the summer of 1981, the aircraft carrier *USS Eisenhower* and an accompanying force of 82 US, Canadian, Norwegian, and British ships used a combination of deceptive lighting and other practices, radio silence, and electronic warfare to sneak through what is known as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and into the North Sea. The initiative even took advantage of cloud cover to evade Soviet satellites. When Soviet maritime patrol planes finally found them, the carrier's fighter wing staged simulated attacks on the "Bear" patrol planes as they were performing in-flight refueling. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8efbdv0y7e0t2h33pb8pa)) > In October, the US invaded Grenada and attacked Cuban troops there assisting the leftist regime. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgy8381458shkgks2d6ca4)) > Autumn Forge, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgyvmzyq29sq5nkxnq03p1)) > Exercise Able Archer '83. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgymnwde2pcsq9rzn4gyq8)) > It began with a massive airlift of 16,000 US troops to Europe on 139 flights, all under radio silence. The Soviets had never seen anything like it. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tgz6zpzmwre025b11y2yph)) > With Brezhnev's death on November 10, 1982, the RYAN number likely slipped into the red. Fearing that the US would take military action to take advantage of the shuffling at the top of the Politburo, the KGB and GRU operations in the West were placed on high alert to watch for any military activity. In the Soviet military, no one was sure who had nuclear release authority until Andropov was named as Brezhnev's successor on November 15. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8evsq3dsm0855xt5bdkt5)) > September 26, 1983 the Oko early warning system reported *twice* that US ballistic missiles had been launched ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th0jkt4q6j0zb00afk9r45)) > A report from early in 1984 placed the RYAN score at 45; it may have dipped even lower during the fall of 1983. Any numbers in this range would have likely pushed Soviet paranoia to the edge. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th18yg59e769acp8td911k)) > Some KGB operatives objected to the analyses that they kept getting back from headquarters of the situation—being more familiar with how the West operates, they believed there was no evidence that there was an actual plan to launch a surprise attack. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th2446r6tbxpc797kn3k0x)) ##### The answer is 42 > Pretty much everything the Reagan administration and the US military did in 1983—along with some of the things the Soviets thought that they had done—pushed the buttons on RYAN. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8ftzvzm5hnmadfq4wat38)) > Over 40,000 NATO troops were on the move across Europe under command using encrypted communications and often operating under radio silence. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th30ce9x1649ehmyr2ewp5)) > At the same time, there was a complete stand-down of all other flight operations as aircraft were made ready for combat. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th5hwad8d8xvwh8b00exec)) > Soviet strike fighter-bombers in East Germany and Poland were loaded with nuclear weapons. A ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th5yd2gd480jkzmxj8b2sx)) > All of this took place during a major Soviet holiday—the anniversary of the October revolution, not a time usually reserved for military exercises. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th6ryrjxggch419tsdmj5k)) > Around November 8, Oleg Gordievski warned British intelligence that the Kremlin was close to pressing the button. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th7j114xe73sd0yncdh6ve)) > As Andropov became incapacitated, there was near panic that this would be the moment the US was waiting for to strike. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th7z1ys5e3vj0mn5gzwh5e)) > In a [June 1984 memo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Able_Archer_83#/media/File:1983_Memo_on_US_Soviet_Tension.jpg), CIA Director William Casey forwarded intelligence uncovered about the war scare to the White House. The degree to which the world was put at risk was apparently enough to convince President Reagan to break somewhat from the confrontational foreign policy toward the Soviet Union he had pursued during his first term. In January 1984, he delivered a speech calling for peace with the Soviet Union and the dismantling of all nuclear weapons. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7th99bjesbsxady3neg01mp)) > As if all the tension wasn't enough, on September 26, 1983 the Oko early warning system reported *twice* that US ballistic missiles had been launched. [Lt. Colonel Stanislav Petrov](http://www.wired.com/2007/09/dayintech-0926-2/), the watch officer in the Soviet Air Defense Forces' command bunker outside Moscow that night, made a gut call that the launch warnings were a malfunction. (It was later determined the warnings were caused by the way the sun bounced off high-altitude clouds). If Petrov had followed procedures in place, Andropov would have been alerted of a nuclear launch and an immediate launch of ICBMs would have been ordered. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8hk42xamm8y99zwjjtpmb)) > Recent artificial research by Google has demonstrated how machine learning systems can go wrong when fed random data, finding patterns that aren't there—[a behavior they called "inceptionism.](http://googleresearch.blogspot.com/2015/06/inceptionism-going-deeper-into-neural.html)" ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h7tham5zrta9kffy0nmmdkhc)) > During this period, the RYAN score dropped precipitously. A report from early in 1984 placed the RYAN score at 45; it may have dipped even lower during the fall of 1983. Any numbers in this range would have likely pushed Soviet paranoia to the edge. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8hykn7fx0j6h0xjj254f5)) ##### DEFCON 1 > In the US, Autumn Forge was not seen as being particularly provocative. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8jj19a0m6jkw3gdmaqde6)) > Two field officers in London complained to their station chief about the disconnect in Moscow, telling him that the station might be partly to blame because of the "alarmist reports on the West's military preparations, intensified ideological struggle, and similar themes to satiate Moscow's demands for RYAN reporting." ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8kvd8kjnjqp0csbz8k8d9)) > Able Archer '83, the culmination of the Autumn Forge exercise. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8mypg5b4pptwhcnbywemf)) > Over 40,000 NATO troops were on the move across Europe under command using encrypted communications and often operating under radio silence. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8n9qff0j8rkem4yr2z88r)) > At the same time, there was a complete stand-down of all other flight operations as aircraft were made ready for combat. Helicopters ferried nuclear warheads to be loaded into weapons and aircraft. Missile and air forces were put on a round-the-clock 30-minute alert. Soviet strike fighter-bombers in East Germany and Poland were loaded with nuclear weapons. About 70 SS-20 missiles were put on ready alert with warheads loaded. And ballistic missile subs were ordered to disperse from port beneath the Arctic ice cap in preparation for an incoming attack. All of this took place during a major Soviet holiday—the anniversary of the October revolution, not a time usually reserved for military exercises. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8pyrjevnzbknwkx82gd19)) > Around November 8, Oleg Gordievski warned British intelligence that the Kremlin was close to pressing the button. But the next day, Andropov (already in questionable health) became seriously ill and dropped out of the public eye. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8qfmd3za0qzva2z0v4rr9)) > The Soviet leadership had never completed provisions for the military acting in the absence of political control. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8r4k91ja44tvckqagcwa6)) > The degree to which the world was put at risk was apparently enough to convince President Reagan to break somewhat from the confrontational foreign policy toward the Soviet Union he had pursued during his first term. In January 1984, he delivered a speech calling for peace with the Soviet Union and the dismantling of all nuclear weapons. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8s2p9qswfhv7nvtxy72xe)) ##### How about a nice game of chess? > But RYAN is also a dramatic example of how analytic systems can lead their users astray. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z8tef68d79b4s05c4n7a8v)) > Perhaps we should remember Operation RYAN the next time there's a conversation about letting autonomous systems control weapons—no matter what the caliber. Maybe we should all have AI stick to chess for a while longer. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01h3z7y2e8bd1s07syjhehz88d))