# The Iraq War’s Intelligence Failures Are Still Misunderstood  ## Metadata - Author:: [[Samuel Helfont]] - Full Title:: The Iraq War’s Intelligence Failures Are Still Misunderstood - Category: #articles - URL: https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/the-iraq-wars-intelligence-failures-are-still-misunderstood/?__s=xp05977nxem40kqcu9uq ## Highlights > Yet, once the American-led coalition toppled the Iraqi regime in 2003, it quickly became evident that there were no weapons of mass destruction or active ties to Osama bin Laden ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwprs1ynqwswz10xtdmm2fh2)) > Since the demise of Saddam’s rule, historians have been blessed with millions of pages of internal Iraqi records containing the former regime’s innermost secrets ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwprvh3z7vgtnsyee1a2hxm9)) #### Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction > The basic history of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction has now been well-[documented](https://web.archive.org/web/20170324220357/https:/www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf). The country had them in the 1980s. Saddam ordered their use them against [Iranian forces](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2020.1795600) and even his own people ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwprwnrd6z1k8vdx1ggc20ye)) > By the end of the decade, Iraq had [completely dismantled](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-DUELFERREPORT/context) his illicit weapons programs ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpry4abdqzjs00pzemq7g2g)) > For example, the United States government had intercepted snippets of Iraqi communications in which senior Iraqis ordered a site to be cleansed prior to the arrival of U.N. inspectors ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps3jq3ktffzv0d9taxx5jt)) > In the full context [provided](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA446305.pdf) by Iraqi records, it became clear that the government was worried about a false positive from the residue of a long-dead program. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps2qr54tfnnqtjj4mws0mr)) > Saddam had dismantled his illicit weapons programs but wanted to leave a residue of doubt about them to deter the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, he could not come clean about completely dismantling his weapons program ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps56rk3pr7cjqpw01y9hma)) > One Iraqi general [claimed](https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/middleeast/even-as-us-invaded-hussein-saw-iraqi-unrest-as-top-threat.html) Saddam Hussein was pursuing a strategy of “deterrence by doubt.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps687tg2wes3q03p13cvct)) > As he [told](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/iraq-against-the-world-9780197530153?cc=us&lang=en&) the regime leadership in one closed-door meeting during the late 1990s, “you might think we still have hidden chemical weapons, missiles and so forth. We have nothing; not even one screw.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps9gjq5qs4e7040tsh9w63)) #### New Scholarship on Iraqi Weapons > As the CIA [concluded](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20120905/CIA-Iraq.pdf) in a 2006 retrospective, when Saddam Hussein refused, intelligence analysts in Washington assumed he had something to hide. Instead, he was simply hoping to avoid a coup. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpscg6z77rzh6taadmjb5ef)) > The Iraqi leadership did not, as is widely believed, try to create a deterrent effect through calculated ambiguity as to whether Iraq no longer possessed WMD.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsd8r82k3ptfprxhwtpas0)) > Rather than elaborate schemes or hidden agendas, sometimes the problems in Iraq stemmed from the type of good old-fashioned incompetence one often finds in authoritarian regimes ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsdngd8ft9kq7kpgnv9t4w)) > Every time Saddam Hussein cooperated, he was punished, and therefore, he eventually stopped doing so. As he [told](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/iraq-against-the-world-9780197530153?cc=us&lang=en&) his advisors, “We can have sanctions with inspectors or sanctions without inspectors; which do you want?” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsezdmrf394ne856bxytgt)) #### Iraq’s Support of Terrorism > Senior Bush administration officials and right-wing intellectuals made [false](https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3080244) and [reckless](https://www.amazon.com/Connection-Collaboration-Hussein-Endangered-America/dp/0060746734) claims about Iraqi connections to terrorists. Despite their allusions and assertions, Saddam had no active links to al-Qaeda in 2001 and no ties to the 9/11 attacks in the United States. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsg9m2bv879ph6x33qfj78)) > In 1994, bin Laden was living in Sudan. The director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, along with Saddam Hussein’s son Uday, made contact with him through a Sudanese intermediary. The Iraqis met bin Laden with Saddam’s approval in 1995 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpskyvxmsjwd4a7rn62bv7c)) > However, it appears Baghdad lost contact with him. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsmr28kv2dq7g0sf2zj8yh)) > Clearly, then, there was no ideological impediment to cooperation between the Iraqis and the type of people who carried out the 9/11 attack. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpspaj7qas58d4rzv4ssdb5)) > In fact, internal Iraqi documents [show](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/compulsion-in-religion-9780197601266?lang=en&cc=us) [unequivocally](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iraq/saddams-isis) that Saddam Hussein made no such ideological conversion. He still hated Islamists and did everything he could to suppress them in Iraq. Yet that did not stop him from supporting them [abroad](https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698590) when his interests aligned with theirs. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsqr4w5vak7tm41j4j9b0q)) #### Conclusion > Unfortunately, public debates about these questions have not kept pace with the rather significant advances made by scholars ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsrm6cet4v6aj05c80j6y6)) > Saddam Hussein did not try to trick outsiders into thinking that he had weapons of mass destruction as a form of deterrence ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpss9xj3bekp6d17kkzar9t)) > The U.S. government had a flawed strategy rooted in poor incentives and dubious analysis ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsrz0swvyys1sgjq2vactb)) > Saddam Hussein had no ties to the 9/11 attacks, and he was not an Islamist ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpssety2674t7d5x3ncxmjm)) # The Iraq War’s Intelligence Failures Are Still Misunderstood  ## Metadata - Author:: [[Samuel Helfont]] - Full Title:: The Iraq War’s Intelligence Failures Are Still Misunderstood - Category: #articles - URL: https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/the-iraq-wars-intelligence-failures-are-still-misunderstood/?__s=xp05977nxem40kqcu9uq ## Highlights > Yet, once the American-led coalition toppled the Iraqi regime in 2003, it quickly became evident that there were no weapons of mass destruction or active ties to Osama bin Laden ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwprs1ynqwswz10xtdmm2fh2)) > Since the demise of Saddam’s rule, historians have been blessed with millions of pages of internal Iraqi records containing the former regime’s innermost secrets ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwprvh3z7vgtnsyee1a2hxm9)) #### Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction > The basic history of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction has now been well-[documented](https://web.archive.org/web/20170324220357/https:/www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf). The country had them in the 1980s. Saddam ordered their use them against [Iranian forces](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2020.1795600) and even his own people ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwprwnrd6z1k8vdx1ggc20ye)) > By the end of the decade, Iraq had [completely dismantled](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-DUELFERREPORT/context) his illicit weapons programs ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpry4abdqzjs00pzemq7g2g)) > For example, the United States government had intercepted snippets of Iraqi communications in which senior Iraqis ordered a site to be cleansed prior to the arrival of U.N. inspectors ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps3jq3ktffzv0d9taxx5jt)) > In the full context [provided](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA446305.pdf) by Iraqi records, it became clear that the government was worried about a false positive from the residue of a long-dead program. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps2qr54tfnnqtjj4mws0mr)) > Saddam had dismantled his illicit weapons programs but wanted to leave a residue of doubt about them to deter the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, he could not come clean about completely dismantling his weapons program ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps56rk3pr7cjqpw01y9hma)) > One Iraqi general [claimed](https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/middleeast/even-as-us-invaded-hussein-saw-iraqi-unrest-as-top-threat.html) Saddam Hussein was pursuing a strategy of “deterrence by doubt.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps687tg2wes3q03p13cvct)) > As he [told](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/iraq-against-the-world-9780197530153?cc=us&lang=en&) the regime leadership in one closed-door meeting during the late 1990s, “you might think we still have hidden chemical weapons, missiles and so forth. We have nothing; not even one screw.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwps9gjq5qs4e7040tsh9w63)) #### New Scholarship on Iraqi Weapons > As the CIA [concluded](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20120905/CIA-Iraq.pdf) in a 2006 retrospective, when Saddam Hussein refused, intelligence analysts in Washington assumed he had something to hide. Instead, he was simply hoping to avoid a coup. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpscg6z77rzh6taadmjb5ef)) > The Iraqi leadership did not, as is widely believed, try to create a deterrent effect through calculated ambiguity as to whether Iraq no longer possessed WMD.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsd8r82k3ptfprxhwtpas0)) > Rather than elaborate schemes or hidden agendas, sometimes the problems in Iraq stemmed from the type of good old-fashioned incompetence one often finds in authoritarian regimes ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsdngd8ft9kq7kpgnv9t4w)) > Every time Saddam Hussein cooperated, he was punished, and therefore, he eventually stopped doing so. As he [told](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/iraq-against-the-world-9780197530153?cc=us&lang=en&) his advisors, “We can have sanctions with inspectors or sanctions without inspectors; which do you want?” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsezdmrf394ne856bxytgt)) #### Iraq’s Support of Terrorism > Senior Bush administration officials and right-wing intellectuals made [false](https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3080244) and [reckless](https://www.amazon.com/Connection-Collaboration-Hussein-Endangered-America/dp/0060746734) claims about Iraqi connections to terrorists. Despite their allusions and assertions, Saddam had no active links to al-Qaeda in 2001 and no ties to the 9/11 attacks in the United States. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsg9m2bv879ph6x33qfj78)) > In 1994, bin Laden was living in Sudan. The director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, along with Saddam Hussein’s son Uday, made contact with him through a Sudanese intermediary. The Iraqis met bin Laden with Saddam’s approval in 1995 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpskyvxmsjwd4a7rn62bv7c)) > However, it appears Baghdad lost contact with him. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsmr28kv2dq7g0sf2zj8yh)) > Clearly, then, there was no ideological impediment to cooperation between the Iraqis and the type of people who carried out the 9/11 attack. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpspaj7qas58d4rzv4ssdb5)) > In fact, internal Iraqi documents [show](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/compulsion-in-religion-9780197601266?lang=en&cc=us) [unequivocally](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iraq/saddams-isis) that Saddam Hussein made no such ideological conversion. He still hated Islamists and did everything he could to suppress them in Iraq. Yet that did not stop him from supporting them [abroad](https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698590) when his interests aligned with theirs. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsqr4w5vak7tm41j4j9b0q)) #### Conclusion > Unfortunately, public debates about these questions have not kept pace with the rather significant advances made by scholars ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsrm6cet4v6aj05c80j6y6)) > Saddam Hussein did not try to trick outsiders into thinking that he had weapons of mass destruction as a form of deterrence ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpss9xj3bekp6d17kkzar9t)) > The U.S. government had a flawed strategy rooted in poor incentives and dubious analysis ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpsrz0swvyys1sgjq2vactb)) > Saddam Hussein had no ties to the 9/11 attacks, and he was not an Islamist ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01gwpssety2674t7d5x3ncxmjm))